Introduction
Environmental tax reform has gained momentum as an important part of a package of policy instruments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective manner (OECD, 2004 ). These policies replace revenue from existing taxes with revenue from taxes on pollution.
The presence of distortions in the tax system gives rise to the potential for simultaneous improvements in environmental outcomes and economic performance called a double dividend
[see, for example, Goulder (1995a Goulder ( , 1995b , Parry (1997) In a different vein, and more importantly from the standpoint of this paper, we have witnessed a generalized growing concern over mounting public debt in recent years and the need to promote fiscal sustainability. CO 2 taxes and auctioned emissions permits have emerged as potentially important instruments for increasing public revenues [see, for example, Metcalf and Weisbach (2008), Galston and MacGuineas (2010) , Metcalf (2010) and Nordhaus (2010) ]. In this context, this paper expands the traditional focus of the literature on the double dividend to the quest for a third dividend, fiscal sustainability. We define this third dividend as a reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio resulting from revenue neutral environmental fiscal reform. This is a very strong definition in that it excludes the direct use of CO 2 tax revenue to pay down public debt and instead focuses on second order tax revenue and spending effects. Generally, analyses of the public debt implications of environmental fiscal reforms focus on using CO 2 The links between climate policy, the economy and the public budget are fundamental since they directly correlate to some of the most important policy constraints faced by many countries in their pursuit of sound climate policies: the need to enact policies that promote longterm growth and fragile public budgets. These policy constraints are particularly relevant for the less developed energy-importing economies in the EU, such as Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, for example. As EU structural transfers have shifted towards new member states, these countries have been forced to rely on domestic public policies to promote real convergence to EU standards of living. This poses a challenge since growing public spending and, more recently, 2 falling tax revenues and countercyclical policies have contributed to a fast increasing public debt and a sharp need for budgetary consolidation.
In this context of low growth and high public debts, and even more so in light of the austerity policies to be implemented in the foreseeable future in these countries under the auspices of the IMF and the EU, it is easy to dismiss environmental efforts as untimely. The key objective in this paper is to determine whether or not environmental fiscal reform can actually interact positively with the other policy concerns, and -ultimately, whether the current economic and fiscal difficulties should be regarded as a hindrance or as a catalyst for enacting climate policies. This is in line with the recent foremost recommendations of the OECD (2011).
In this paper we address these issues in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Portuguese economy. This model incorporates fully dynamic optimization behavior, endogenous growth, and a detailed modeling of the public sector activities, both tax revenues and consumption and investment spending. Previous versions of this model have been used to evaluate the impact of tax policy [see Rodrigues (2002, 2004) ], social security reform [see Pereira and Rodrigues (2007) ] and, more recently, energy and environmental policy [see Pereira (2011a, 2011b) ].
This model brings together two important strands of the taxation literature [see the above applications of this model for a detailed list of the references]. On one hand, it follows in the footsteps of computable general equilibrium modeling. It shares with this literature the ability to consider the tax system in great detail. This is important given the evidence that the costs and effectiveness of climate policies are influenced by existing tax distortions [see, for example, Goulder and Bovenberg (1995) , Goulder et al (1999) , Parry and Williams (1999) , Babiker et al (2003) and Goulder and Parry (2008) ]. On the other hand, it incorporates many of the insights of 3 the endogenous growth literature. In particular, it recognizes that public policies have the potential to affect the fundamentals of long term growth and not just for generating temporary level effects [see Xepapadeas (2005) ].
The key distinguishing feature of this model in the applied climate policy literature is its focus on endogenous growth and the associated treatment of public sector optimization behavior [see Conrad (1999) and Bergman (2005) for literature surveys]. Productivity enhancing public sector investment in public capital and human capital, which have been largely overlooked in applied climate policy [Carraro et al. (2009)] , are, in addition to private investment, the drivers of endogenous growth. Furthermore, the analysis of the interaction between fiscal policies, public capital, economic growth, and environmental performance has garnished little attention and then only in a theoretical framework [Greiner (2005) and Gupta and Barman (2009)].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief model description together with a discussion of several implementation issues. Section 3 presents marginal abatement cost curves and discusses the economic and budgetary impact of environmental fiscal reform. Section 4, considers in great detail a variety of environmental fiscal reform policies consistent with achieving the 20/20 emission goals for Portugal. Finally, section 5 provides a summary of the simulation results and concluding remarks.
The Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
We consider a decentralized economy in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework. All agents are price-takers and have perfect foresight. With money absent, the model is framed in real terms. There are four sectors in the economy -the production sector, the household sector, the public sector and the foreign sector. The first three have an endogenous behavior but all four 4 sectors are interconnected through competitive market equilibrium conditions, as well as the evolution of the stock variables and the relevant shadow prices. All markets are assumed to clear.
The trajectory for the economy is described by the optimal evolution of eight stock and five shadow price variables -private capital, wind energy capital, public capital, human capital, and public debt together with their shadow prices, and foreign debt, private financial wealth, and human wealth. In the long term, endogenous growth is determined by the optimal accumulation of private capital, public capital and human capital. The last two are publicly provided.
The Production Sector
Figure 1 presents an overview of the production structure of the economy. Aggregate depreciates at a rate ߜ . Gross investment, ‫ܫ‬ ௧ , is dynamic in nature with its optimal trajectory induced by the presence of adjustment costs. These costs are modeled as internal to the firm -a loss in capital accumulation due to learning and installation costs -and are meant to reflect rigidities in the accumulation of capital towards its optimal level. Adjustment costs are assumed 5 to be non-negative, monotonically increasing, and strictly convex. In particular, we assume adjustment costs to be quadratic in investment per unit of installed capital.
The firms' net cash flow, ‫,ܨܥܰ‬ (Eq. 4), represents the after-tax position when revenues from sales are netted of wage payments and investment spending. After-tax net revenues reflect the presence of a private investment and wind energy investment tax credit at an effective rate of ߬ ூ் and ߬ ூ்ோ , respectively, taxes on corporate profits at a rate of ߬ ூ் , and Social Security contributions paid by the firms on gross salaries, ‫ݓ‬ ௧ ‫ܮ‬ ௧ ௗ ‫ܭܪ‬ ௧ , at an effective rate of ߬ ிௌௌ .
Buildings make up a fraction, 0 < ሺ1 − ߩ ூ ሻ < 1, of total private investment expenditure.
Only this fraction is subject to value-added and other excise taxes, the remainder is exempt. This situation is modeled by assuming that total private investment expenditure is taxed at an effective rate of ߬ ்ா்,ூ . The corporate income tax base is calculated as ܻ ௧ net of total labor costs, ሺ1 + ߬ ிௌௌ ሻ‫ݓ‬ ௧ ‫ܮ‬ ௧ ௗ ‫ܭܪ‬ ௧ , and net of fiscal depreciation allowances over past and present capital investments, ‫ܫߙ‬ ௧ . A straight-line fiscal depreciation method over ‫ܲܧܦܰ‬ periods is used and investment is assumed to grow at the same rate at which output grows. Under these assumptions, depreciation allowances simplify to ‫ܫߙ‬ ௧ , with ߙ is obtained by computing the difference of two infinite geometric progression sums, and is given by (Eq. 5).
Optimal production behavior consists in choosing the levels of investment and labor that maximize the present value of the firms' net cash flows, (Eq. 4), subject to the equation of motion for private capital accumulation, (Eq. 3). The demands for labor and investment are given by (Eq. 6) and (Eq. 7), respectively, and are obtained from the current-value Hamiltonian function, where ‫ݍ‬ ௧ାଵ is the shadow price of private capital, which evolves according to (Eq. 8).
Finally, with regard to the financial link of the firm with the rest of the economy, we assume that at the end of each operating period the net cash flow is transferred to the consumers.
The Energy Sector
The energy sector is an integral component of the firms' optimization decisions.
Aggregate primary energy demand is produced with CES technology (Eq. 9) in which crude oil, ‫݈ܱ݅݁݀ݑݎܥ‬ ௧ , and non-transportation fuels, ‫ܨܶܰ‬ ௧ are substitutable at a lower rate reflective of the dominance of petroleum products in transportation energy demand and the dominance of coal, natural gas and, to a lesser extent, wind energy, in electric power and industry. Nontransportation fuels are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology (Eq. 15) recognizing the relatively greater potential substitution effects in electric power and industry. The accumulation of wind energy infrastructure is characterized by (Eq. 16) where the physical capital, wind turbines, depreciate at a rate of ߜ ோ . Gross investment in wind energy infrastructure, ‫ܫܴ‬ ௧ , is dynamic in nature and is subject to adjustment costs as private capital.
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Optimal primary energy demand is derived from the maximization of the present value of the firms' net cash flows as discussed above. The first order condition for crude oil demand and non-transportation energy demand are given by (Eq. 13) and (Eq. 14). In turn, the demand for coal and natural gas are defined through the nested dual problem of minimizing energy costs (Eq.
10) given the production function (Eq. 15) and optimal demand levels given in (Eq. 13), yielding (Eq. 12). Finally, the variational condition for optimal wind energy investment is given in (Eq.
17) and the equation of motion for the shadow price of wind energy is given in (Eq. 18).
The hydrogen and carbon contained in fossil fuels generates the potential for heat and energy production. Carbon is released from the fuel upon combustion; 99.0% of the carbon released from the combustion of petroleum, 99.5% from natural gas, and 98.0% from coal, oxidizes to form CO 2 . Together, the quantity of fuel consumed, its carbon factor, oxidation rate, and the ratio of the molecular weight of CO 2 to carbon are used to compute the amount of emissions from fossil fuel combustion is given in (Eq. 19).
The Households
An overlapping-generations specification was adopted in which the planning horizon is finite but in a non-deterministic fashion. A large number of identical agents are faced each period with a probability of survival, ߛ. The assumption that γ is constant over time and across agecohorts yields a perpetual youth specification in which all agents face a life expectancy of
Without loss of generality, the population, which is assumed to be constant, is normalized to one.
Therefore, per capita and aggregate values are equal.
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The household, aged ܽ at time ‫,ݐ‬ chooses consumption and leisure streams that maximize intertemporal utility, (Eq. 20), subject to the consolidated budget constraint, (Eq. 21). The objective function is lifetime expected utility subjectively discounted at the rate of ߚ .
Preferences, ‫ݑ‬ ା௩,௧ା௩ , are additively separable in consumption and leisure, and take on the CES form where ‫ܤ‬ is a size parameter and ߪ is the constant elasticity of substitution. The effective subjective discount factor is ߛߚ meaning that a lower probability of survival reduces the effective discount factor making the household relatively more impatient.
The budget constraint, (Eq. 21), reflects the fact that consumption is subject to a valueadded tax rate of ߬ ், and states that the households' expenditure stream discounted at the after-tax market real interest rate, 1 + ሺ1 − ߬ ሻ‫ݎ‬ ௧ା௩ , cannot exceed total wealth at ‫,ݐ‬ ܹܶ ,௧ . The loan rate at which households borrow and lend among themselves is 1 ߛ ⁄ times greater than the after-tax interest rate reflecting the probability of survival.
For the household of age ܽ at ‫ݐ‬ , total wealth, ܹܶ ,௧ (Eq. 22), is age-specific and is composed of human wealth, ‫ܹܪ‬ ,௧ , net financial worth, ‫ܹܨ‬ ,௧ , and the present value of the firm, ‫ܨܸܲ‬ ௧ . Human wealth (Eq. 23), represents the present discounted value of the household's future labor income stream net of personal income taxes, ߬ ூ் , and workers' social security contributions, ߬ ௐௌௌ . Labor's reward per efficiency unit is ‫ݓ‬ ௧ .
The household's wage income is determined by its endogenous decision of how much labor to supply, ‫ܵܮ‬ ௧ = ‫ܮ‬ ത − ℓ ௧ , out of a total time endowment of ‫ܮ‬ ത , and by the stock of knowledge or human capital, ‫ܭܪ‬ ௧ , that is augmented by public investment on education. Labor earnings are discounted at a higher rate reflecting the probability of survival.
A household's income is augmented by net interest payments received on public debt, ‫ܦܲ‬ ௧ , profits distributed by corporations, ‫ܨܥܰ‬ ௧ , international transfers, ܴ ௧ , and public 11 transfers, ܴܶ ௧ . On the spending side, debts to foreigners are serviced, taxes are paid and consumption expenditures are made. Income net of spending adds to net financial wealth (Eq. 24). Under the assumption of no bequests, households are born without any financial wealth. In general, total wealth is age-specific due to age-specific labor supplies and consumption streams.
Assuming a constant real interest rate, the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth is age-independent and aggregation over age cohorts is greatly simplified. Aggregate consumption demand is given by (Eq. 25) and an age-independent coefficient enables us to write the aggregate demand for leisure, (Eq. 26), as a function of aggregate consumption.
The Public Sector
The equation of motion for public debt, ‫ܦܲ‬ ௧ , (Eq. 28), reflects the fact that the excess of government expenditures over tax revenues has to be financed by increases in public indebtedness. Total tax revenues, ܶ ௧ , (Eq. 29) include personal income taxes, ‫ܶܫܲ‬ ௧ , corporate income taxes, ‫ܶܫܥ‬ ௧ , value added taxes, ‫ܶܣܸ‬ ௧ , social security taxes levied on firms and workers ‫ܶܵܵܨ‬ ௧ and ܹܵܵܶ ௧ . All of these taxes are levied on endogenously defined tax bases. Residual taxes are modeled as lump sum, ‫ܶܵܮ‬ ௧ , and are assumed to grow at an exogenous rate.
The public sector pays interest on public debt at a rate of ‫ݎ‬ ௧ and transfers funds to households ܴܶ ௧ in the form of pensions, unemployment subsidies, and social transfers, which grow at an exogenous rate. In addition, it engages in public consumption activities, ‫ܩܥ‬ ௧ , and public investment activities in both public capital and human capital, ‫ܩܫ‬ ௧ and ‫ܪܫ‬ ௧ .
Public investments are determined optimally, respond to economic incentives, and constitute an engine of endogenous growth. The accumulations of ‫ܭܪ‬ ௧ and ‫ܩܭ‬ ௧ are subject to depreciation rates, ߜ ு and ߜ ு , and to adjustment costs that are a fraction of the respective investment levels. The adjustment cost functions are strictly convex and quadratic. 12 Public sector decisions consist in choosing the trajectories for ‫ܩܥ‬ ௧ , ‫ܪܫ‬ ௧ , and ‫ܩܫ‬ ௧ that maximize social welfare, (Eq. 27), defined as the net present value of the future stream of utility derived from public consumption, parametric on household private consumption-leisure decisions. The optimal choice is subject to three constraints, the equations of motion of the stock of public debt, (Eq. 28), the stock of public capital, (Eq. 30), and the stock of human capital, (Eq. 31). The optimal trajectories depend on ‫ݍ‬ ௧ାଵ , ‫ݍ‬ ௧ାଵ ீ , and ‫ݍ‬ ௧ାଵ ு , the shadow prices of the public debt, public capital, and human capital stocks, respectively. The relevant discount rate is
because this is the financing rate for the public sector. Optimal conditions are (Eq. 32) for public debt, (Eq. 33) for public consumption, (Eq. 34-35) for public investment, and (Eq. 36-37) for investment in human capital. 
The Foreign Sector
The equation of motion for foreign financing, ‫ܦܨ‬ ௧ , (Eq. 40), provides a stylized description of the balance of payments. Domestic production, ܻ ௧ , and imports are absorbed by domestic expenditure and exports. Net imports, −ܰܺ ௧ , (Eq. 39), are financed through foreign transfers, ܴ ௧ , and foreign borrowing. Foreign transfers grow at an exogenous rate. In turn, the domestic economy is assumed to be a small, open economy. This means that it can obtain the desired level of foreign financing at a rate, ‫ݎ‬ ௧ ி , which is determined in the international financial markets. This is the prevailing rate for all domestic agents.
The Intertemporal Market Equilibrium
The intertemporal path for the economy is described by the behavioral equations, by the equations of motion of the stock and shadow price variables, and by the market equilibrium conditions (Eq. 38-41). The labor-market clearing condition is given by (Eq. 38) where a structural unemployment rate of ܷܴ ௧ is exogenously considered. The product market equalizes demand and supply for goods and services. Given the open nature of the economy, part of the demand is satisfied through the recourse to foreign production, hence (Eq. 39) and (Eq. 40).
Finally, the financial market equilibrium, (Eq. 41), reflects the fact that private capital formation and public indebtedness are financed by household savings and foreign financing.
We define the steady-state growth path as an intertemporal equilibrium trajectory in which all the flow and stock variables grow at the same rate, ݃, while market prices and shadow prices are constant. There are three types of restrictions imposed by the existence of a steadystate. First, it determines the value of critical production parameters, like adjustment costs and depreciation rates given the initial capital stocks. These stocks, in turn, are determined by assuming that the observed levels of investment of the respective type are such that the ratios of 14 capital to GDP do not change in the steady state. Second, the need for constant public debt and foreign debt to GDP ratios implies that the steady-state public account deficit and the current account deficit are a fraction ݃ of the respective stocks of debt. Finally, the exogenous variables, such as public transfers or international transfers, have to grow at the steady-state growth rate.
Dataset, Parameter Specification, and Calibration
The model is implemented numerically using detailed data and parameters sets. The dataset is reported in Table 2 Table 3 . The baseline primary demand for crude oil grows to 658.8 PJ, coal demand to 169.1 PJ and demand for natural gas to 158.0 PJ in 2020. These lead to a baseline projection for emissions of 71.9 Mt CO 2 in 2020.
Parameter values are reported in Table 4 and are specified in different ways. Whenever possible, parameter values are taken from the available data sources or the literature. This is the case, for example, of the population growth rate, the probability of survival, the share of private consumption in private spending, the output scale parameter, and the different effective tax rates.
In turn, consistent with the conditions for the existence of a steady-state, the exogenous variables, as mentioned above, were set to grow at the observed long-term steady-state growth rate. These parameters play no direct role in the model calibration. All the other parameters are obtained by calibration; i.e., in a way that the trends of the economy for the period 1990-2008 are extrapolated as the steady-state trajectory. These calibration parameters assume two different roles. In some cases, they are chosen freely in that they are not implied by the state-state restrictions. This is the case, for example, of the discount rate, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, the elasticities of substitution, the shares for labor and capital in production, and the public capital externality. Although free, these parameters have to be carefully chosen since their values affect the value of the remaining calibration parameters. Accordingly, they were chosen either using central values or using available data as guidance. The remaining calibration parameters are obtained using the steadystate restrictions as discussed above.
Environmental Fiscal Reform

Simulation Design
Our simulation experiments are designed to identify the impact of environmental fiscal reform on indicators for the three dividends: CO 2 emissions, economic performance, and the public sector account. The different revenue recycling policies are grouped according to the basic mechanism for cost containment involved, as opposed to public sector accounting conventions: 19 policies that stimulate demand, namely, value added tax replacement and public consumption financing; employment oriented policies, including personal income tax replacement, firms' social security contribution replacement, and human capital investment financing; and, policies that encourage investment in physical capital, including private capital and wind energy capital investment tax credits and public capital financing. This analysis provides a consistent methodological framework and a natural way of ranking policy alternatives.
The CO 2 tax works primarily through two mechanisms. First, it increases energy expenditure and reduces the firms' net cash flow, household income and domestic demand.
Second, by affecting relative prices, it drives changes to the firms' input structure that affect the marginal productivity of factor inputs. These scale and substitution effects are central in defining the impact of CO 2 taxes. Each of the environmental fiscal reforms counteracts, to varying degrees, these negative scale and substitution effects either by stimulating demand, encouraging employment or by promoting capital accumulation. Furthermore, we will distinguish between the reforms' potential for reducing the costs of achieving an emissions target, a weak form of the double dividend, and the potential for actually stimulating economic activity, a stronger form of the double dividend.
The environmental fiscal reforms under consideration are designed to be revenue neutral.
By construction, the CO 2 tax revenue is directly offset by increased spending or decreased tax receipts. The policies, however, are not deficit neutral. Thus, the net effect of the reform on the public sector account, and the realization of a third dividend, depends on optimal public sector spending decisions, second order tax revenue effects and tax interactions which can increase distortions in a second best setting. 20 
Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
We begin by constructing marginal abatement cost curves to evaluate the effects of environmental fiscal reform. These are presented in Figures 3, 4 and 5 for 2020, a common benchmark year for climate policy analysis. Each figure has three panels, corresponding to each of the three dividends: the top panel presents the marginal abatement cost curves in terms of the effectiveness of CO 2 taxation in reducing emissions; the middle panel presents the corresponding impact on GDP; finally, the bottom panel measures the corresponding impact on public debt.
Naturally, all policies lead to favorable environmental outcomes, the first dividend. The wind energy investment tax credit financing policy yields the largest reduction in emissions.
Next, the demand oriented policies, i.e. the public consumption and value added tax recycling policies, result in slightly smaller emissions reductions than the lump sum case. Public investment in education, the personal income tax and firms' social security contributions recycling policies provide another band for emissions reductions of roughly the same magnitude, reflecting their shared focus on employment. Finally, the public capital investment and the private investment tax credit policies generate the smallest reduction in emissions.
Environmental fiscal reform always reduces the costs of climate policy relative to the lump sum recycling policy, a realization of the weak form of the double dividend. Generally, the improvements in economic performance relative to the lump sum recycling policy are weakest for the demand driven policies, followed by the employment oriented policies and the policies promoting physical capital accumulation. In fact, we observe a realization of the strong double dividend for the policies that encourage private and public capital formation. Interestingly, incentives for wind energy reduce climate policy costs by more than the demand driven policies, the only change to the policy rankings from an environmental to an economic perspective. From the discussion above, it is clear there is a trade-off between the environmental effectiveness and the economic costs of the environmental fiscal reforms. The economic stimulus resulting from reductions in the policies' costs increases energy demand, generating a small rebound in emissions and reducing the policies' effectiveness. This effect is largest for the private investment tax credit and public investment financing policies due to their positive economic impact but remain relatively modest. For a tax of €15.00 per tCO 2 the rebound in emissions is equal to 7.7% of the reduction in the lump sum recycling policy for the private investment tax credit financing policy, 3.9% for the personal income tax replacement, 3.2% for the firms' social security contributions replacement, and 1.7% for the value added tax replacement policy. Only the wind energy investment tax credit financing policy yields a reduction in policy costs while increasing its efficacy, allowing for a 11.7% larger reduction in emissions.
The marginal abatement costs curves also present the potential for a third dividend from environmental fiscal reform. A reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio can be achieved through two mechanisms, optimal reductions in public spending or positive second order tax effects due to expanding tax bases following the realization of the second dividend. Each of the reforms yields smaller public debt reductions than the lump sum recycling policy. The most beneficial policies are those that stimulate employment. The value added tax replacement policy and the public consumption financing policy differ more substantially here than with respect to their environmental and economic impacts, with a larger impact on public debt for the public consumption policy. This arises from the simulation design because the public sector is free to increase public consumption, relative to the lump sum case, in the value added tax replacement policy. Generally, however, financing public expenditure increases public debt. Finally, both the private investment tax credit and public investment financing policies increase public debt. 25 
On the Effects of Achieving Existing 2020 Climate Policy Objectives
We now examine the energy sector, economic and budgetary impacts of compliance with the emissions target set out in EU Decision 406/2009/EC, limiting emissions in Portugal in 2020 to a 1.0% increase above 2005 levels. Table 5 presents the energy and environmental impacts   while Tables 6-11 present the economic and budgetary impacts.
On the Energy Sector and Environmental Impacts
By normalizing the policies by their emissions target, the emissions reductions are the same and the energy sector impacts are very similar across policies. Accordingly, we only discuss the case of the lump sum recycling policy. From the marginal abatement curves, we find that a tax of €16.50 per tCO 2 achieves the 2020 emission target.
This CO 2 tax is effective in reducing emissions by 9.1 Mt CO 2 or 12.7%, which is consistent with a reduction in the emissions intensity of the economy to 0.3061 tCO 2 per thousand Euros GDP and a reduction in per capita emissions to 5.9 tCO 2 . This is achieved by shifting primary energy demand away from fossil fuels, from carbon intensive fossil fuels and substitution away from energy inputs all together. Indeed, primary energy demand falls by 8.4%
while overall primary demand for fossil fuels falls by 11.5%. This results from the increase in the price of fossil fuels relative to renewable energy due to the CO 2 tax. In addition, the tax changes the relative price of fossil fuels to reflect their carbon content. As a consequence, we observe a 34.3% reduction in coal demand coupled with a 23.3% increase in investment in wind energy.
Oil and gas demand fall by 7.6% and 3.0%, respectively. 
On the Effects of the Lump Sum Recycling Policy
Although the lump sum recycling policy works to boost household income and, therefore, stimulate demand, we discuss this scenario separately because it provides a basic reference point for our analysis of the remaining policies.
CO 2 taxation increases energy costs, which affects the firms' net cash flow, employment and investment demand, as well as household wealth. The negative effect on the firms' net cash flow limits input demand. Employment falls by 0.4%, less than the 0.4 pp drop in private investment, which corresponds to a 1.9% drop below its baseline steady state trajectory. Both reductions, however, are substantially smaller than the 11.5% drop in primary demand for fossil fuels. This is consistent with an overall reduction in factor input levels coupled with a shift in input demand in favor of capital and especially labor. This same pattern also develops for public sector investment decisions, with similar effects on production. Given the reductions in factor demand, it is no surprise that CO 2 taxation has a negative impact on GDP. The reduced net cash flow has a direct impact on household income, driving down private consumption. This initiates an important dynamic feedback between income, consumption and production. Overall, private consumption falls by 0.3 pp. Ultimately, the net effect of this process is a 0.9 pp reduction in GDP. Thus, the strong form of the double dividend does not materialize for the lump sum recycling policy. On the positive side, this policy yields a 2.0 pp reduction in public debt to 83.1% of GDP, allowing for the realization of a third dividend. Spending reductions due to the greater opportunity cost of public funds are the driving forces behind this effect. Overall, public expenditure falls 0.6 pp, or 2.0%, led by reductions in public consumption of 0.4 pp and public capital investment of 0.1 pp. Public spending falls in a manner consistent with a shift in the input mix towards employment through public investment in education. Overall, the drop in productivity-enhancing public investment activities compounds the negative effects of CO 2 taxation on private inputs and economic activity as discussed above. In turn, there is a contraction of the tax bases due to lower incomes coupled with reductions in product and factor demand. This is, however, largely offset by the additional revenue from the CO 2 tax resulting in a net increase in tax revenues of 0.2 pp. Social security contributions and personal income tax revenues decline by the largest relative magnitude, 1.2%, while value added tax revenues fall by the largest absolute amount, 0.1 pp.
On the Effects of Demand-Driven Recycling Policies
We consider now the two remaining demand driven reforms. Here, CO 2 tax revenue is used to stimulate private and public consumption activities by offsetting value added tax revenues and by financing public consumption directly. Both policies require a tax of €17.00 per tCO 2 to achieve the emissions target. The resulting CO 2 tax revenues can finance either a 5.5% reduction in the value added tax rate or a 4.5% increase in public consumption relative to the lump sum recycling policy.
Both demand policies yield a small improvement in economic performance over the lump sum recycling policy, yielding a weak double dividend. In both cases, GDP falls by 0.7 pp while employment remains virtually unchanged in 2020 and falls by 0.2% in 2050. This small 30 improvement in GDP and, relatively greater improvement, in employment outcomes reflects the small distortions associated with indirect taxation.
In turn, both demand policies allow for a third dividend as a result of optimal reductions in public spending. Both policies, however, yield smaller reductions in public debt than the lump sum recycling policy. Because the government is free to increase public consumption levels in the value added tax replacement policy, this policy leads to smaller public debt gains than the public consumption financing.
The principal distinction between the value added tax replacement policy and the public consumption financing policies lies in their impact on private and public consumption behavior.
Naturally, the value added tax replacement policy stimulates increased private consumption; the public consumption financing policy encourages increased public consumption.
On the Effects of Employment-Driven Recycling Policies
We now turn our attention to the employment driven reforms, the personal income tax replacement, firms' social security contributions replacement and human capital investment financing policies. These allow us to evaluate labor responses to reductions in the tax burden on households and firms as well as responses to financing for labor productivity enhancing public sector investment in education. These policies require a tax of €17.50 per tCO 2 to ensure compliance with climate policy objectives. CO 2 tax revenues finance a 18.0% reduction in the personal income tax rate, a 9.4% reduction in the employers' social security contribution rate or a 7.7% increase in public investment in education.
Overall, employment driven policies generate larger improvements in economic performance and larger reductions in the costs of climate policy than do the demand driven policies. These policies yield a 0.3 pp drop in GDP for the personal income tax replacement policy, 0.5 pp for the firms' social security contributions replacement policy and a 0.6 pp for the human capital investment financing policy. The personal income tax and firms' social security contributions replacement policies result in a strong double dividend with respect to employment that is, an improvement in environmental performance together with employment gains, while the human capital investment financing does not. Employment increases by 0.5% in the personal income tax replacement policy and by 0.3% in the firms' social security contributions replacement policy while it falls by 0.2% in the human capital financing policy. The main difference between the personal income tax replacement policy and the remaining two employment policies is their impact on wages. The firms' social security contribution replacement policy represents a labor demand shock which, leads to a 0.6% increase in wages. In contrast, the increase in labor supply for the personal income tax replacement policy represents a labor supply shock which, leads to a 0.8% drop in wages. This leads to larger employment and private consumption gains in the personal income tax replacement policy.
In addition, both the personal income tax replacement and the firms' social security replacement policies allow for a third dividend while the human capital investment financing policy does not. Public debt falls by 1.8 pp in the personal income tax replacement policy and by 1.7 pp in the firms' social security contribution replacement policy and increases by 1.2 pp in the human capital investment financing policy.
The impact of these policies on employment and wages, by affecting private consumption decisions, leads to differences in public sector expenditure patterns. Public expenditure falls by less in the social security contributions replacement policy due primarily to smaller reductions in public consumption but also due to smaller reductions in public investment in education. The similarities in public debt effects between the two tax policies results from greater levels of revenues, particularly employees' social security contributions in the firms' social security contributions replacement policy. Naturally, the human capital investment financing policy yields larger levels of public expenditure.
On the Effects of Investment-Driven Recycling Policies
Finally, we consider the cases using CO 2 tax revenues to finance physical capital investment incentives, namely a private capital and wind energy infrastructure investment tax credit, and public capital investment. Climate objectives can be achieved with a CO 2 tax of €14.50 per tCO 2 when tax revenues are used to finance a wind energy investment tax credit. In contrast, both the private investment tax credit policy and the public investment policy require a tax of €18.50 per tCO 2 . The resulting tax revenues could be used to finance a 188 times larger wind energy investment tax credit or a 5.9 times larger private investment tax credit financing or a 20% increase in public investment.
The private investment tax credit policy stimulates a 0.9 pp increase in private investment, boosting GDP by 0.3 pp by 2020 and 1.5 pp by 2050. In turn, the public investment Employment increases by 0.1%, in 2050, in the private investment tax credit financing policy and by 0.4% for the public capital financing policy. These employment gains, however, occur only after somewhat substantial short term losses in employment, particularly for the public capital financing policy. The case of the wind energy investment tax credit policy differs in that it only yields a double dividend in its weak form.
The relative merits of the private capital investment tax credit and public investment financing policies depends primarily on the marginal products of each type of capital investment, its depreciation rate and adjustment costs. In both policies, the marginal increase in investment financing is equal to the CO 2 tax revenue. As a result, the public investment policy is subject to greater adjustment costs due to the relatively smaller stock. Over the long term, however, the lower depreciation rate and slightly larger marginal product provide a substantial contribution towards economic growth. Similarly, the impact of the wind energy financing policy is subject to substantial adjustment costs and is sensitive to its lower marginal product than that for either private capital or public capital.
Of the three policies, only the wind energy investment tax credit financing yields, albeit only very marginally, a third dividend, reducing public debt by 0.4 pp. The public investment financing policy increases public debt by 8.1 pp while the private investment tax credit financing policy increases public debt by 2.5 pp. The increases in public debt result in the former from substantial increases in public consumption and public investment while in the later they are the 37 outcome of more modest public consumption increases together with weaker revenue growth, particularly over the short term as firms employ less labor.
On the Relevance of Endogenous Public Sector Spending Decisions
In the previous sections, we considered optimal adjustments to public sector spending decisions, often in the form of reductions in public spending, which thereby lead to favorable budgetary outcomes. It is well understood, however, that political realities may not allow for such spending reductions. Here we explore the implications of maintaining pre-reform public consumption and public investment levels on both the economic and budgetary impact of the reforms. Table 12 presents simulation results which highlight the role of public sector spending decisions on the realization of a second and third dividend, respectively.
Exogenous public consumption decisions affect both the magnitude and the nature of the second dividend, particularly with respect to employment. This is most notable for the public consumption financing policy and the wind energy investment tax credit financing policy in which a strong employment dividend materializes in the presence of an exogenous public consumption trajectory. The connection between employment and consumption is clearly derived from the households' optimization problem. Public consumption financing in particular plays affects private consumption and labor supply decisions directly.
Exogenous public sector investment decisions affect the magnitude of the second dividend without affecting the potential for the realization of a strong second dividend. At a design level, exogenous public sector investment decisions increase the reference trajectory for public investment in human capital and public capital relative to the central scenario. As a result, the human capital and public capital investment financing policies permit substantially larger levels of investment with positive economic growth effects. In this context, the human capital investment financing policy yields marginal long term GDP gains and a strong form of the 38 Note: R -Reference, S -Strong, W -Weak double dividend. Generally, however, the exogenous public investment levels serve to dampen the effects of the policies.
Exogenous public consumption decisions imply that, in most cases, optimal reductions in public consumption do not materialize. This effectively eliminates the gains in fiscal consolidation in all but the firms' social security contributions option. In contrast, lower levels of 40 public consumption in the public investment financing policy allow for a third dividend where it did not exist before. In general, it is clear that responsive and responsible optimal public consumption decisions are critical for the third dividend to materialize.
In turn, with exogenous public investment trajectories, which eliminate the mechanisms of endogenous growth, any meaningful public debt gains are neutralized in all but the public consumption financing policy. Although under personal income tax replacement and the firms' social security contributions replacement a third dividend can still be identified, it is rather small and certainly substantially smaller than under our central assumption.
The firms' social security contributions recycling option generates positive tax revenue effects as a result of the increase in wages and employment levels. This leads to an increase in workers social security contributions and positive second order tax revenue effects. Although this is positive it reflects social security accounts more than the general government balance. In practice, this is one of the more robust policies in terms of producing the three dividends.
For the public capital investment financing policy, expanding tax bases contribute to positive second order tax revenue effects. Thus, if public consumption activities do not expand, this policy can lead to emissions reductions, increased employment and GDP growth and fiscal consolidation. The same effect does not materialize for the private investment tax credit policy due to the fact that the substitution of private capital for labor inputs is more pronounced, leading to losses short term losses in personal income tax revenue and social security contributions.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the extent to which environmental fiscal reform, considering a variety of CO 2 tax revenue recycling options, can be designed to produce the three dividends:
41 lower emissions, lower climate policy costs and fiscal consolidation. All policy options under consideration achieve, by design, the first dividend, i.e., a reduction in CO 2 Wind energy investment tax credits are often used to boost the environmental effectiveness of climate policy programs. From our analysis of the marginal abatement cost curves, we see that financing these credits with CO 2 tax revenue does indeed generates the largest emissions reduction. As a practical policy point, this means that these credits require a lower equilibrium tax for meeting climate policy objectives, specifically of €14.50 per tCO 2 . In the context of auctions for the emissions trading system, this means lower equilibrium prices or, if the use of the revenue is not disclosed prior to auction, a weaker secondary market.
Simulation results show that environmental fiscal reform can stimulate economic performance through private and public investment financing policies -an increase in GDP of 1.1 pp and 4.4 pp, respectively -and generate employment gains through reductions in the personal income tax rate and firms' social security contributions -of 0.2% and 0.1% respectively,
In this case, we observe a strong realization of the second dividend. Generally, however, all reforms considered reduce climate policy costs compared to the reference lump sum recycling option and thereby allow for the realization of a weak double dividend. Policies that promote 42 investment activities generate the largest reduction in policy costs followed by those that affect employment and those that affect final demand.
These results contribute to the mounting evidence that environmental fiscal reforms that encourage private capital formation provide greater economic gains than those that encourage final demand [see, for example, Shackleton et al. (1996) , Bovenberg and Goulder, (1995) , Farmer and Steininger (1999) , and Takeda (2007)]. These gains typically stem from the greater distortions associated with capital taxation in existing tax systems. A novel feature of our analysis, however, is that we show that recycling policies that promote public investment can also lead to very strong gains. In addition, we find significant differences between industry subsidies that stimulate employment and investment. Employment policies tend to have a smaller long term impact than the investment policies, which indeed yield a strong double dividend. The employment policies can, however, provide a short term cost mitigation strategy for overcoming adjustment costs associated with capital investment.
Simulation results suggest that the third dividend, a reduction in public debt, occurs under several of the revenues recycling options under consideration. They also show that this is mostly due to optimal reductions in public expenditure associated with the increasing opportunity cost of public funds. Generally, analyses of the public debt implications of environmental fiscal reforms focus on using CO 2 tax revenue to finance the purchase of financial assets, paying down debt, and find that the costs of these policies exceed those of other revenue recycling options Indeed, given that our recycling policies are revenue neutral, by design their impact on public debt is completely determined by second order tax revenue effects and public sector spending decisions. In this vein, when we consider political constraints that would prevent such optimal 43 reductions in public spending, only in the firms' social security contributions and the public investment recycling options do we observe the third dividend. This highlights the critical importance of flexible and responsible spending decision in achieving budgetary consolidation in a framework of environmental fiscal reform.
To conclude, it should be highlighted that although the analysis and results in this paper are directly relevant for policy making in Portugal, their interest and applicability is far from parochial. Concerns over economic growth and fiscal sustainability are at the forefront of policy discussion in many countries. Against this backdrop environmental policies are regarded with concern if not outright dismissed as untimely. Our results, however, make it clear that it is possible to design environmental fiscal policies that achieve the emission goals while at the same time promoting economic performance and fiscal consolidation. This implies that, the current economic and fiscal woes do not have to be viewed as a hindrance to the implementation of environmental policies but can actually be regarded as a catalyst for such policies. Well designed environmental fiscal reforms, can provide for all three dividends, a reduction in emissions, economic and employment stimulus, and fiscal consolidation.
